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inflation targeting yields an outcome that mimics the price stabilisation advantages of a
hard peg without its drawbacks in terms of extreme volatility. This sample of countries,
not covered by the Kuttner and Posen study, supports their conclusions for both nominal
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Introduction. Combined Monetary Frameworks
Any specific type of monetary framework can be thought of as providing a commitment
technology. In the “first best”, a stable equilibrium is achieved in an environment without
any kind of distortions or rigidities (ie, prices and quantities adjust freely, costlessly and
immediately, there are no market frictions of any kind, etc). Monetary policy “surprises”
have no short or long run effects, since inflation expectations always equal their realisations.
Nevertheless, if rigidities do exist (such as multi-period work contracts with rigid nominal
wages, “menu costs” or staggered prices adjustments), policy “surprises” would have
potential short-run real effects. In such a framework, even if it is optimal for a policy maker
to commit ex ante, it is not optimal to commit ex post (for the classic reference on the so-
called “time inconsistency problem”, see Barro and Gordon, 1983). Forward-looking agents
incorporate such possibility in their expectations, yielding an outcome of higher inflation
without even short-run output gains: this is the so-called “inflation bias” of a discretionary
policy regime. One of the ways to correct this bias is through a “commitment” or a “rule”
technology: the use of a credible monetary policy rule applied by a conservative and
independent monetary authority is called a “commitment” equilibrium
2 (see Rogoff, 1985).
The resulting one shot-game eliminates the “inflation bias” and the “stabilisation bias”
3,
thus mimicking the “second best” solution on a static context. Nevertheless, on a
dynamic setting, both biases re-appear on Rogoff’s solution (see Walsh, 1995). However,
as Svensson (1997) shows, a monetary authority that acts as a combination of a Rogoff-
type independent central bank with a non-negative (ie asymmetric) inflation-targeting
rule would successfully eliminate both the inflation and the stabilisation bias,
successfully mimicking, therefore, the attainable “second best” equilibrium. Therefore,
the introduction of an explicit monetary or inflation target (inflation is generally considered
a superior target, due to its timely production, easy understanding by the domestic economic
agents and its full incorporation of all available information in a single indicator) in the
monetary authority’s loss function is one way to achieve the results of a “second-best”
commitment-type equilibrium through this “constrained discretion” mechanism (see
Mishkin, 2000).
The exchange rate framework, of course, must be set in a consistent fashion with the
monetary framework. In a currency board mechanism this consistency is simple and
automatic – monetary policy is completely (in a pure currency board) endogenous to the
arrangement
4, since the monetary base must equal at least the amount of reserves held by the
monetary authority, being therefore a framework completely determined by the exchange
2Of course, a currency board arrangement (CBA) is just a commitment mechanism that transfers the solution of the
“time inconsistency problem” to the policy makers of the nation that the currency is pegged to.
3The theoretical possibility of a monetary authority to care “too little” about output stabilisation (informally known as
the “inflation nutter” scenario). The current dispute about setting an explicit non-negative inflation target for the Bank
of Japan, which only became institutionally independent from the Japanese Ministry of Finance back in 1998, partially
reflects such concerns, and gives them empirical relevance. Due to a continuous deflationary process, Japan is mired in
a classic Keynesian “liquidity trap”, and it is argued that above zero inflation caused by a deliberate monetary
expansion would make monetary policy effective again.
4On the other hand, fiscal policy is not automatically endogenised by this arrangement, and can place a serious strain on
its sustainability, as the collapse of Argentina’s CBA so clearly shows.4
rate arrangement. On the other hand, a pure float regime (under the assumption of free
movement of capital) is necessary for the effectiveness of an active monetary policy
5.
Working within such an implicit theoretical referential, Kuttner and Posen (2001)
perform a combined empirical analysis of central bank independence, announced targets
and exchange rate regimes for a large set of developed and developing countries in a post
Bretton Woods time sample. They estimate that a set-up combining a free float, an
independent monetary authority and inflation targeting yields an outcome that mimics the
price stabilisation advantages of a hard peg without its drawbacks in terms of “extreme”
nominal
6 events (like very large devaluations), which could imply that a move from one
framework to the other would be welfare improving in a Pareto sense. The aim of the
current paper is to verify whether such an outcome is also observed in the sub-sample of
accession countries (not covered by the Kuttner and Posen study). If so, the policy
implications can be non-trivial, as the choice of the exchange rate regime in the pre-
accession period is left virtually to the individual countries themselves. Given that
possibility, a country should obviously strive to choose the combined arrangement that
would increase its aggregate welfare (this being eventually measured by a simple loss
function that would encompass a set of nominal and real variables, being the “usual
suspects” inflation and GDP).
Therefore, this paper tries to empirically evaluate which, among the combined exchange
rate and institutional frameworks available for the accession countries during the period
until full euro area membership, would seem to deliver better results in terms of level and
variability of such a set of variables, using a simple and transparent framework. In this
way, the paper hopes to generate a non-trivial input into the ongoing policy formulation
debate that will be relevant not only to a single, specific country, but, potentially at least,
to all nations involved in the process of enlargement. Namely, the aim is to verify
whether the assumed superiority of more rigid exchange rate regimes in terms of nominal
volatility compared to more flexible regimes is observed considering combined
frameworks.
The first Chapter of the paper gives a brief description of the current exchange rate
arrangements of the accession countries (a fuller description of their combined
frameworks is provided in Annex 1). The second Chapter gives a description of the
estimation framework and the data used, followed by the estimation results. The paper
ends with a conclusion.
5This is one of the essential insights of the so-called “Mundell-Fleming” model, which is basically the
formalisation of the Keynesian IS/LM framework in an open economy setting.
6The explicit assumption in their work is that monetary or exchange rate arrangements have only nominal
effects, and that real variables – like growth rates – are determined, on the long run, by the factor
endowments and production technology, as well as by the business cycle on the middle to short run.5
1. Monetary and Exchange Rate Frameworks of the Accession Countries
Contrary to the usual perception of a smorgasbord of exchange rate regimes among
accession countries
7, it could be said that a movement towards a “two-corner” solution, ie
either hard-pegs/CBAs or floats (see Table 1 below, a more complete description is to be
found in Annex 1), is the current observed outcome amongst these countries, which
matches a similar world-wide trend (see Fischer, 2001).
Table 1. Exchange rate arrangements of the accession countries
Countries Currency Exchange rate regime Date of
Introduction
Bulgaria Lev Currency board (anchor is the Euro). July 1997
Czech Republic Koruna Float with DIT May 1997
Estonia Kroon Currency board (anchor is the Euro). June 1992
Hungary Forint Float with DIT October 2001
Latvia Lats
Peg with the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights
(SDR), with narrow intervention bands (+/-
1%)
February 1994
Lithuania Litas Currency board (anchor is the Euro) February 2002
Poland Zloty Float with DIT April 2000
Romania Leu Float August 1992
Slovakia Koruna Float October 1998
Slovenia Tolar Float October 1991
Sources: Vinhas de Souza and Hölscher, 2001b
The exception was Hungary who, after its decision to expand the fluctuation band of its
sliding peg regime to ±15 (the same range in the ERM-2) on 3 May, 2001, announced a
float coupled with a DIT framework to be effective by 1 October of the same year,
following similar decisions taken by Poland in 2000, and by the Czech Republic already
in 1997.
Nevertheless, the path to the current quasi two-corner solution is littered by the ghosts of
several kinds of exchange rate and monetary frameworks past (see Annex 1), which
enables the construction of a time series dimension of such arrangements.
7The paper concentrates only on the Central Eastern European and Baltic accession countries sub-set,
namely, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia.6
2. Data and Estimations
The estimation work will “map” the variability of the chosen variable to be analysed to
the relevant components of the combined framework as described in Chapter 1 (namely,
exchange rate framework, targeting framework and level of independence of the
monetary authority).
Any estimation performed on the set of countries that this work addresses faces some
obvious difficulties. The time series are notoriously short (in most cases do not make
sense, or the series are just not available before 1992, given the recent independence of
some of the countries) and are clearly non-stationary. They are buffeted by the initial
nominal and real shocks related to the transition process that happened in different
countries at different moments, and by what could be classified as “common external
shocks”, such as the Russian Crisis in the second half of 1998 and the “oil shock” of
1999–2000.
The time dimension problem is minimised by using higher frequency series available for
most of the variables of interest to us here. Those series are matched as closely as
possible with regime dummies, following whenever possible the classification used by
Kuttner and Posen (2001), ibidem, from now on indicated as KP.
The Central Bank Independence (CBI) dummies were constructed using national Central
Bank laws (available from their web sites) and their changes through time as a reference
8.
As KP indicates, from the usual criteria found in CBI indices, two tend to stick out in
terms of their significance: the appointment and dismissal procedures of the head of
monetary authority and the prohibition (or otherwise) of monetary financing of
government debt. Here, those two are also used to classify the institutions either as
partially independent (at least one of them is present) or independent (both are present)
9.
The stylised path of CBI levels in the accession countries can be described as almost
monotonically increasing, starting from an already relatively high level (it must be
remembered that the independence of monetary authority is actually one of the famous
Maastricht Criteria).
The Targeting Regime dummies used here differentiate between narrow money targets
(M0/M1), broad money targets (M2/M3), and an explicit inflation target (be it either CPI,
as in Poland, or a “net inflation” one, as in the Czech case).
8Cukierman et al (2001) produces an updated version of their famous index, now in terms of a yearly series for the
period 1989–1998 that includes all countries in our sample, adding a time dimension to their analysis. One of their
conclusions is that no level of CBI would have been able to have averted the inflationary jumps associated with the on-
set of world price levels in the beginning of “transition”. See also Loungani and Sheets (1997) and Äimä (1998).
9Contrary to earlier versions of this work, this differentiation also applies to currency boards, which would enable us to
differentiate the eventual credibility effects linked to high-independence CBAs – like the Estonian case, when
compared to partially independent CBAs – like the Lithuanian case. Anyway, as Hallerberg and Vinhas de Souza
(1999) point out, the CBI indices for the accession countries tend to show rather high values, which is due to one of the
requirements of the so-called Maastricht Criteria.7
Finally, the exchange rate regime dummies distinguish between four de jure
10
classifications possible: CBA, hard pegs, aggregate that encompasses sliding pegs, target
zones and shifting baskets, and floats
11.
The data was taken from the IMF/IFS series, for the period from February 1989 (Hungary
was an early reformer) to May 2001. The (heteroscedasticity-consistent) regressions will
be done upon an unbalanced panel on “calendar” time
12, given that the individual national
series have different time dimensions.
The general form of the equation(s) to be estimated for all series is given below. It
corresponds to KP’s exchange rate variability equation:
µ α α α α
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where V is the dependent variable, indexed for country n and period i, and the α’s are the
coefficients of the country and time varying dummies (namely, dummies for floating
regime – Float, currency board – CBA, sliding peg – SPeg, hard peg – HPeg, narrow
money target – TargetMN, broad money target – TargetMB, inflation target – TargetIR,
high level of institutional independence of the monetary authority – CBIT, and a low
level of institutional independence of the monetary authority – CBIP). This same
equation is estimated for all the series in order to enable a direct comparison of the
results.
The set of variables is estimated in terms of their levels, but also on several “variability”
measures, namely in terms of their standard deviations, the 90% standard deviations (ie,
excluding the extreme 5% realisations on both sides of the distribution) to measure
eventual non-linearities of the frameworks in different portions of the distribution, the
coefficient of skewness (which is a measure of asymmetry of the distribution of a series
10Certain studies stress the difference between de facto and de jure regimes. This distinction is particularly common in
the “fear of float” literature (see Calvo and Reinhart (2000), for a recent review). This is usually assessed by comparing
the volatility of the exchange rate with the volatility of reserves but, as indicated by KP, just a de jure announcement is
expected to have effects in terms of the expectations of the private agents.
11Eurosation is one policy option that is not analysed it this framework, because no accession country has used it so far.
This was discussed separately in the previous versions of this work. Nevertheless, given its potential importance, the
author of the paper strongly suggests a specific research effort to be devoted to this subject.
12Alternative estimations involving an adjustment for “transition time” were discarded by this author. In Bakanova at al
(2001) ibid, this author estimates cross country “growth-regressions” for all the “transition” economies in Europe, both
in “calendar” and in “transition” time, and the results do not differ in any significant manner. The reason is obvious: the
further away you are from the onset of the transformation process, the less relevant such a distinction becomes.
Alternatively, another way to deal with that would be to use a shorter, more recent sample; to adjust for initial shocks
related to the onset of “transition” and the “transition time” asymmetry. The author of the present research has done this
in earlier versions of the paper. However, it presented problems, as indicated in previous sections, all the economies in
our set were being buffeted by a series of common shocks in the 1997–2000 period: the Asian crisis, the Russian crisis
and the energy shocks of 1999–2000. Due to that, some of the results were of very counterintuitive interpretation.
Besides, one of the regressions (the GDP quarterly regression at the end of this section) just could not be estimated in
this shorter sample. Decisively, the longer sample used here should be understood as a better approximation of the true
long-run values of the parameters.8
around its mean) and the coefficient of kurtosis
13 (which measures the “peakness” or
“flatness” of a series, when compared to a normal distribution).
An e-mail discussion with Kenneth Kuttner clarified that the process in KP for the
calculation of all their “variability” series used a sample that remained constant while all
the elements of the framework remained unchanged. The author of the present paper
decided to use a centred “sliding sample” of two, three and four observations for the
estimation, respectively, of the standard deviation(s), skewness and kurtosis series, for
both theoretical and practical reasons. From the theory side, the conceptual underpinnings
that could lead one to assume that “variability” should remain constant within any given
framework seemed unclear. From the empirical side, the use of such an assumption
would lead one to miss the “spikes” observed during episodes like the Asian and Russian
crises, that should contain important information about the properties of the
arrangements. Additionally, for countries with essentially unchanged frameworks during
the sample like, for instance, Estonia the process used by KP would generate series that
would be, for all practical purposes, constant terms to be used as the dependent variables
in our estimations. Finally and decidedly, using individual observations for each
unchanged framework period would yield a sample where the number of observations
would be roughly similar to the number of regressors with the associated problems of
degrees of freedom for the estimations.
















































where s is the standard deviation estimated as above.




















































where s is, again, the standard deviation estimated as above.9
2.1. Nominal variables
2.1.1. Exchange Rates
The monthly series of changes in the average monthly exchange rate of the national
currency to USD (with the exception of Lithuania, where DEM was used) were used in
the estimations
14; negative movements indicate appreciation, positive ones depreciation.
As can be seen from the estimation results in Table 2, Annex 2, in terms of changes,
floats lead to the highest significant degree of depreciation, while other institutional
components (namely, targeting frameworks) seem to be able to almost fully counteract
this tendency. On the other hand, central bank independence seems to actually increase it.
In terms of their full standard deviations, the highest volatility is indeed observed in a
float, while the lowest is associated with a sliding peg, which is partially counteracted by
certain types of targeting frameworks, especially by inflation targeting. When using 90%
standard deviations, the point estimates are roughly similar for both the float, which still
has the highest value, and the CBA, but the lowest value is actually associated with the
hard peg, and an inflation-targeting framework would actually increase the variability.
Considering the skew, the significant coefficients on float and hard pegs are rather
similar, and the institutional framework could offset most of those tendencies. In terms of
kurtosis, the only significant coefficient is associated with an inflation-targeting
framework: given that it is negative, it may be assumed that it could be used to partially
counteract a “peaked” distribution.
In terms of general conclusions, it could be said that any assumed substantial advantage
in terms of lower variability associated with more rigid regimes is not observed, when the
combined framework is taken into consideration. It is also worth mentioning that most of
the gains are associated with targeting frameworks, not with the independence level of
the monetary authority.
Of course, the above conclusion comes from the implicit assumption that the effects
associated with the individual components of a joint framework would be additive
15.T o
test this, individual elements are estimated in an “interactive dummy framework”, to
estimate the joint effects of the relevant combinations of frameworks. As can be seen
from the results of the estimation in Table 3 (see Annex 2), this is indeed the case: the
individual elements do show “additive” properties, besides their individual effects. Floats
combined with inflation targeting and a high degree of independence would yield similar
results in terms of changes in levels of the exchange rate to a high independence CBA:
both are among the lowest coefficients of level variability. The same “dampening” effect
on the volatility of the float towards the levels of more rigid regimes is observed in terms
of standard deviations, both for the full and 90% series.
14KP also use nominal rates, due to the same data problem faced in this study: the lack of complete monthly real
effective exchange rate series for all the countries in the sample.
15The author of the present paper thanks Űlo Kaasik for making this point.10
Given the availability of some monthly nominal and real effective exchange rate index
series – NEEXR and REEXR for, respectively, 7 and 8 of the countries in the sample
(Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia were the countries excluded from the nominal effective
series, and Latvia and Slovenia from the real effective series), provided by the IMF/IFS
database and by the national central banks, they were also used for some limited
estimations. It must be noted that some of the included series had a somewhat reduced
temporal dimension, so those results should be examined with care: they are presented in
T a b l e s4t o7 ,i nA n n e x2 .
In terms of level changes for NEEXR in Table 4 (see Annex 2, note that here a stable
level would correspond to 100), floats are associated with depreciation, and CBA with a
substantially larger appreciation, while inflation target and full central bank independence
can counteract this. Considering the standard deviations, floats indeed show the highest
deviation, but total CBI would counteract this. However, not to the point where it would
surpass a CBA or a sliding peg, the best performers (note also the relative greater
improvement of CBA with 90% standard deviations, an indication of the more rigid
regime bias to “extreme events”). The additive regressions in Table 5 (see Annex 2)
confirm those results (the almost completely stable NEEXR with a float cum CBI and
DIT is noteworthy, as is the rather small standard deviation “advantage” of a more rigid
regime).
For REEXR level series in Table 6 (see Annex 2), it is worth mentioning that a float, as
one could expect, per se, is almost all that is necessary for a stable real exchange rate
(while CBAs are associated with the highest level of depreciation), and that CBI and DIT
partially counteract each other’s effects. In terms of standard deviations, the highest value
is associated with CBA and the lowest with sliding pegs, the float variation can be almost
totally counteracted by full CBI with a targeting framework (again, the use of 95%
standard deviations shows the larger relative improvement of stricter regimes, confirming
the tendency to “extreme events” of those arrangements). The additivity assumption in
Table 7 (see Annex 2) is confirmed as statistically significant, and supports the previous
results.
As a general conclusion for the block of tested exchange rate series – nominal, nominal
effective or real effective, the assumed advantage of more rigid regimes in terms of
variability is not empirically observed.
2.1.2. Inflation
16
Here, monthly CPI series were used as the dependent nominal variable. As the results of
the estimation in Table 8, Annex 2 indicate, in terms of levels, floats lead to a marginally
higher inflation level than a CBA, but the lowest inflation is actually associated with
pegs, while other institutional components (namely, inflation targeting and CBI) would
seem to be able to almost fully counteract it. In terms of their full standard deviations, the
highest volatility is indeed observed in a float, but is only marginally greater than the one
16KP do their estimations in terms of CPI level and “persistence”.11
in a CBA, the lowest is associated with a peg, but this can be partially counteracted by
the CBI level; when using the 90% standard deviations, the float still has the highest
value and the CBA the lowest, and a targeting framework (especially inflation targeting)
would decrease the variability. Considering the skew, the significant coefficients of float,
CBA and pegs are rather similar: the CBI institutional framework would actually increase
those tendencies, but targeting frameworks could contain it. In terms of kurtosis, the
picture is rather similar.
The conclusion is that the assumed advantage in terms of lower variability associated
with more rigid regimes is not clearly registered, and, again, most of the gains in terms of
volatility reduction are associated with targeting frameworks, not necessarily with the
independence level of the monetary authority.
As Table 9 indicates (see Annex 2), the “additive” assumption is confirmed once again.
Floats combined with inflation targeting and a high degree of independence would yield
the lowest average inflation (the large negative significant coefficient for the float with
money targeting and a partial degree of independence is difficult to interpret) and the
lowest standard deviations, both for the full and 90% series, while the lowest skew and




Estimating the same equation for the real interest rate
18 we get the results listed in Table
10, Annex 2. In terms of levels floats lead to the highest interest rate levels, and pegs to
the lowest, while the other components (namely, inflation targeting and CBI) would seem
to be able to substantially reduce it. Considering their full standard deviations, the highest
volatility is, by far, observed in a float, but this can be partially counteracted by inflation
targeting framework. When using the 90% standard deviations, the float still has the
highest value and the CBA the lowest, and inflation targeting would still decrease the
variability substantially. Considering the skew, the lowest significant coefficient is on the
float, the CBI institutional framework would actually increase those tendencies, but
targeting frameworks could contain it. In terms of kurtosis, the picture is rather similar.
As Table 11 shows (see Annex 2), the “additive” assumption is again confirmed. Floats
combined with inflation targeting and a high degree of independence would yield the
lowest positive real interest rates and the lowest standard deviations and the lowest skew,
but the lowest excess kurtosis is associated with CBA, followed by the float cum CBI
cum IT.
So far, the set of nominal variables confirms, with surprisingly robust results, the
outcome of KP: considering a combined framework, stricter regimes do not necessarily
17KP use the interest rate forward premium in their estimations, the data is not available for most accession countries.
18“Real Interest Rate” is defined here as just the lending rate in time t minus the consumer price inflation realised also
on time t. No consistent series of “expected inflation” would be available for all countries throughout the whole sample.12
outperform the floating ones, neither in terms of level nor variability (regardless of the
exclusion or inclusion of extreme events). Table 2 provides a quick comparison of some
results from our previous estimations with similar ones from KP’s (which are the
coefficients within brackets, below the coefficients estimated from the accession
countries’ sample). For exchange rate and CPI, most of the observed results have at least
the same sign (and most of the results with different signs are not statistically significant),
and some point estimates, like the ones for exchange rate and CPI level changes, are
strikingly similar. This is truly remarkable, given the differences in size, composition and
time dimension of both samples.
Table 2







































































* Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 10% level
2.2. Real variables
19
One of the underlying assumptions of the previous estimations was that nominal
frameworks, as the ones analysed here, would only have effects in terms of nominal
variables. Nevertheless, several works do try to assess the effects of exchange rate
frameworks on growth rates (for an empirical estimation, see Ghosh et al, 1997, for a
model-based simulation for the accession countries, see Vinhas de Souza and Ledrut,
2001c). Albeit it is not clear, ap r i o r i , why and through which channels a nominal
mechanism would have persistent effects on real variables’ growth paths (indeed the studies
above tend to find that the differences in growth performance of different regimes tend to be
non-significant), a recent work by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) found consistent
positive growth effects from float regimes, using modified Barro-type “growth equations”
20.
19In this section, the IMF/IFS series were complemented with data from the Vienna Institute for Comparative
International Studies (WIIW).
20Those effects are completely due to the developing countries in their sample (which includes all the accession
countries, with the exception of Hungary), and the results are robust to the introduction of, among other tests, regional
dummies.13
On the other hand, and far less controversially, one of the major assumed advantages
associated with floating regimes is indeed their assumed capacity to smooth or cushion
shocks, which would indicate that they might affect the variability of real variables
21.
Therefore, as a consistency test, the framework above was extended to real series. Given
that we are dealing with monthly and quarterly data, the effects could be understood as the
short-run effects of the framework on their level and variability.
2.2.1. Unemployment
As the first of the two real variable series, monthly unemployment series were used. A
series of provisos must be made here concerning the data in this section: all the countries
in the sample suffered massive productive dislocations with the onset of transition,
leading to high and, in some cases, due to skills mismatch, persistent unemployment
levels. Also, ethnic and linguistic concerns, especially in the Baltic countries, may
contribute to above equilibrium unemployment levels while, on the other hand, the
official registered unemployment series may likely suffer from a downward bias (see
IMF, 2001 (b)). Finally, this is a shorter sample, starting only in January 1991.
Estimating the same equation as before for the unemployment rate we get the results in
Table 12, Annex 2. In terms of levels, floats lead to the highest unemployment levels and
CBAs to the lowest (perhaps as an indication that one of the assumed mechanisms to
underpin the sustainability of a currency board, namely, flexible labour markets, is indeed
present in those countries), while inflation targeting frameworks would be able to reduce
it, and CBI would actually increase it. The significant standard deviations are rather small
and similar across regimes, with some targeting frameworks increasing it, and CBI
decreasing it. Considering the skew and the kurtosis, the picture is similar. As Table 13
indicates (see Annex 2), the “additive” assumption is once again confirmed, and here, the
assumed variability advantages of more flexible regimes are more strongly observed.
Nevertheless, in terms of a general conclusion, the prior of a worst employment
variability performance of more rigid regimes as compared to floats is, perhaps
surprisingly, not clearly confirmed.
21The “shock-isolation” capabilities of a float regime can be intuitively demonstrated in a simple IS–LM analytical
framework (see Visser & Smits (1995)). Both foreign demand and foreign price shocks are cushioned by a floating
exchange rate. Nevertheless, a foreign interest rate shock is cushioned neither by a float nor by a peg, but the shock
works in opposite directions (in a float, a fall in the “world” interest rates cause a capital inflow and an appreciation of
the exchange rate, leading the IS curve to shift to the left, and conversely, in a hard peg regime). However, in case of
the float, an active monetary policy can be used as an effective instrument by the domestic policy maker (those
conclusions are derived under the assumption of full capital mobility).14
2.2.2. GDP
As the second of our two real variable series, quarterly GDP series were used. A proviso
that not all countries produce quarterly GDP data applies here as well, so for half of our
sample (Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) industrial production series
were used instead. As is known, industrial production can be a rather unreliable proxy for
GDP. Those nominal series are turned into real series (using the CPI as a deflator) which
are turned into indices’ series; their natural logs are used as the dependent variable on our
regressions.
Estimating the same equation for the “GDP” series, we get the results in Table 14, Annex
2: in terms of levels, CBAs slightly outperform all other regimes, but the use of inflation
targeting would more than fully compensate this difference. Standard deviations, on the
other hand, are substantially smaller under a float, with inflation targeting increasing it
somewhat, but this is counteracted by the institutional framework. Considering the skew,
the float is the highest, but some targeting frameworks and CBI can control this. In terms
of the kurtosis, inflation targeting could help a float approach a normal distribution. The
“dummy interaction” estimations mostly support those results (see Table 15 in Annex 2).
As a conclusion, the variability and level of our “GDP” series does seem to be,
respectively, smaller and greater under more flexible regimes. Therefore, here the usual
priors about the regimes do seem to have been confirmed
22.
22A question not addressed here is that smaller, less diversified, more open economies could have a greater GDP
variability than larger, more closed ones, regardless of the type of combined framework used. This question arises due
to the fact that, in our sample, after the initial widespread use of external anchors, only the smaller economies
consistently used harder regimes. Such a “endogenous” hypothesis could be tested with a larger set of countries.15
Conclusions
The aim of this work was to assess whether a combined framework that included the
exchange rate arrangement, the institutional set-up of the monetary authority and the
existence of different types of targeting frameworks would yield differences in terms of
level and variability of a set of nominal and real variables in a sample made of the
accession countries, following the methodology developed by Kuttner and Posen (2001).
The results of the present analysis confirm most of the results obtained by KP.
Considering a combined framework with the three elements above, the assumed
advantages of more rigid exchange rate regimes in terms of, if not the level, then at least
the variability of the series like exchange rate changes, inflation and interest rates, when
compared with floating regimes, is no longer observed.
In addition to the work carried out by KP, one of the fundamental underlying assumption
in their conclusions is the “additivity” of the significant effects estimated for the
individual component of a combined framework (which they do not test). This was
assessed via the use of “interactive dummy models”, which assumed that the additive
nature of individual effects is indeed found to be statistically significant in those
estimations (which can be due to the average high level of CBI amongst the countries in
our sample).
Most of the gains in the reduction of the variability can be linked to the use of targeting
frameworks, especially inflation targeting. The level of independence of a monetary
authority is also a significant element in terms of the effects of the arrangement.
However, given that the credibility effects associated with it can also be achieved within
the institutional set-up of more rigid regimes, the additional gains registered by the more
flexible regimes must come from the targeting mechanism.
In another addition to KP’s work, this paper also estimated the effects of the combined
frameworks in the level and variance of a set of real variables. The results here are less
strong than the ones for the nominal set, mostly due to data problems, but at least
partially the traditional assumption of a smaller real volatility associated with more
flexible regimes seems to be confirmed.
Taken together, the conclusion from the estimations with both sets of nominal and real
variables is that it would be Pareto-improving for an economy to switch from a stricter
regime to a more flexible one – if that change were coupled with CBI and DIT, given that
no losses would be incurred in terms of nominal variability, and gains would be observed
in terms of real variability.
Nevertheless, to derive hard policy conclusions from this set of estimations is a more
problematic proposition. To start with general questions, the data is rather limited in
terms of time and has several shortcomings, as indicated previously. Also, the sample
uses a very specific set of countries in a very particular moment in their histories. Of
course, the broader conclusions are strikingly similar to the KP conclusions, derived from16
a much larger set of countries with a much longer time sample, so their overall robustness
can be assumed. It is also assumed that countries can actually choose their exchange rate
framework, ie this is not endogenously determined by structural factors such as size,
productive structure, etc (for a recent work that supports this “endogenous” view, see
Poirson (2001)). On the other hand, another “endogenous” view, and one that actually
underpins the current EU integration efforts, would see the structure as endogenous to the
policy choice, so an arrangement that may not be optimal ex ante becomes optimal ex
post (see Frankel and Rose (1997)). Also, some of the observed outcomes may be due to
non-considered factors (like labour market institutions, the size and openness of the
economy and a worldwide environment of low inflation during most of the 1990s).
Perhaps more fundamentally, the conclusion about the net Pareto-improving nature of a
switch of frameworks does not assume any kind of eventual costs associated with the
changeover. It is very easy to conceive that credibility losses could be, under certain
circumstances, incurred during the regime change, preventing the country in question
from achieving the expected gains. Of course, any credibility losses leading to eventual
speculative attacks would arise not from the regime switch per se, but from wrong policy
mixes or fundamentals perceived as unsustainable by market agents, which would have
negative effects under any type of combined frameworks.
Also, on sheer operational terms, the effectiveness of a DIT framework hangs on the
stability of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, ie on functioning financial
markets, and on the availability of an effective model to forecast inflation in an
economy
23, as well as on the openness and transparency of the whole procedure to
economic agents, so that they can understand and anticipate monetary policy actions
24.
Therefore, no economy during the early stages of the transition process would have been
able to successfully implement a DIT framework
25. However, “transition” started a full
decade ago
26, and the conditions are plainly there in a growing subset of the accession
countries for its effective introduction.
The conclusion must be that, at least as a policy option, a float coupled with an inflation-
targeting framework administered by a credible and independent monetary authority
should not be dismissed a priori.
23Given that monetary policy actions feed into the wider economy with a lag that can be as long as 18–24 months, in
practical terms, inflation targeting means inflation forecast targeting.
24This, of course, also implies that the private agents must “know the model” which a monetary authority uses.
25For some works on DIT in the accession countries, see Christoffersen and Wescott (1999) and Orlowski (2001) and
(2000).
26And, for some authors, has effectively ended, at least for the accession countries: see Gros and Suhrcke (2000) and
Weder (2001). This author actually agrees with this notion, which explains his reluctance to use the term “transition”.17
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t
l
y
e
m
u
l
a
t
e
d
a
t
l
e
a
s
t
o
n
e
o
f
i
t
s
f
e
a
t
u
r
e
s
–
i
t
a
i
m
s
t
o
k
e
e
p
n
e
a
r
1
0
0
%
o
f
i
t
s
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
b
y
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
r
e
s
e
r
v
e
s
a
s
a
n
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
t
a
r
g
e
t
.
A
s
a
f
u
l
l
-
f
l
e
d
g
e
d
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
b
a
n
k
,
i
t
h
a
s
t
h
e
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
s
e
t
o
f
i
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
p
o
l
i
c
y
t
o
o
l
s
:
r
e
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
s
(
“
r
e
p
o
s
”
)
,
a
t
r
e
a
s
u
r
y
b
i
l
l
m
a
r
k
e
t
,
r
e
s
e
r
v
e
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
,
a
n
d
a
l
s
o
L
L
R
f
a
c
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
.
O
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
l
a
w
f
r
o
m
1
9
M
a
y
1
9
9
2
,
l
a
s
t
a
m
e
n
d
e
d
o
n
1
J
u
n
e
2
0
0
0
A
r
t
i
c
l
e
2
2
:
A
p
p
o
i
n
t
m
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
G
o
v
e
r
n
o
r
b
y
t
h
e
P
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
(
1
9
9
7
a
m
e
n
d
m
e
n
t
)
;
A
r
t
i
c
l
e
3
6
:
P
r
o
h
i
b
i
t
i
o
n
o
f
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
(
1
9
9
8
)
.
I
M
F
e
n
t
r
y
:
M
a
y
1
9
1
9
9
2
.
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
u
s
e
s
a
m
o
d
i
f
i
e
d
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
b
o
a
r
d
a
r
r
a
n
g
e
m
e
n
t
,
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
i
n
1
9
9
4
,
w
h
i
c
h
p
e
g
s
t
h
e
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
n
L
i
t
a
s
t
o
U
S
D
.
T
h
e
R
o
u
b
l
e
w
a
s
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
l
y
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
d
,
a
s
i
n
L
a
t
v
i
a
,
b
y
a
n
i
n
t
e
r
i
m
f
l
o
a
t
i
n
g
c
o
u
p
o
n
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
,
t
h
e
T
a
l
o
n
a
s
,
i
n
M
a
y
1
9
9
2
,
i
s
s
u
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
n
e
w
l
y
r
e
-
c
r
e
a
t
e
d
B
a
n
k
o
f
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
(
B
o
L
)
.
F
r
o
m
M
a
y
t
o
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
1
9
9
2
t
h
e
T
a
l
o
n
a
s
c
o
-
e
x
i
s
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
R
o
u
b
l
e
.
T
h
e
t
a
l
o
n
a
s
w
a
s
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
L
i
t
a
s
i
n
J
u
n
e
1
9
9
3
.
T
h
e
T
a
l
o
n
a
s
,
i
n
a
f
l
o
a
t
r
e
g
i
m
e
,
l
o
s
t
o
v
e
r
5
0
%
o
f
i
t
s
v
a
l
u
e
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
i
t
s
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
A
p
r
i
l
1
9
9
3
.
S
o
m
e
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
r
a
t
e
s
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
w
a
s
r
e
g
a
i
n
e
d
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
L
i
t
a
s
.
N
e
v
e
r
t
h
e
l
e
s
s
,
t
h
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
,
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
o
f
t
h
e
I
M
F
,
d
e
c
i
d
e
d
t
o
p
r
e
s
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
c
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
n
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
n
-
t
y
p
e
C
B
A
a
l
r
e
a
d
y
i
n
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
1
9
9
3
,
a
n
d
t
h
e
C
B
A
w
a
s
f
i
n
a
l
l
y
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
o
n
A
p
r
i
l
1
,
1
9
9
4
(
4
/
1
U
S
D
)
.
I
t
i
s
a
m
o
d
i
f
i
e
d
C
B
A
,
s
i
n
c
e
s
o
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
b
a
n
k
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
(
l
i
k
e
r
e
s
e
r
v
e
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
a
n
d
s
h
o
r
t
-
t
e
r
m
c
r
e
d
i
t
f
a
c
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
,
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
t
h
e
L
L
R
)
w
e
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
r
v
e
d
.
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
r
e
-
p
e
g
g
e
d
t
h
e
L
i
t
a
s
d
i
r
e
c
t
l
y
t
o
t
h
e
E
u
r
o
o
n
2
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
2
0
0
2
.
0
.
1
2
5
(
1
9
9
7
)
,
0
.
8
2
(
1
9
9
8
)
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
l
a
w
f
r
o
m
1
9
9
4
(
1
9
9
2
L
a
w
:
B
u
d
g
e
t
a
r
y
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
n
g
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
)
,
l
a
s
t
a
m
e
n
d
e
d
o
n
1
3
M
a
r
c
h
,
2
0
0
1
.
A
r
t
i
c
l
e
2
7
:
N
o
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
t
o
t
h
e
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
;
n
o
a
r
t
i
c
l
e
s
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
t
o
b
o
a
r
d
a
p
p
o
i
n
t
m
e
n
t
.
I
M
F
e
n
t
r
y
:
A
p
r
i
l
2
9
,
1
9
9
2
.
P
o
l
a
n
d
T
h
e
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
c
h
o
i
c
e
o
f
a
p
e
g
r
e
g
i
m
e
i
n
P
o
l
a
n
d
w
a
s
l
i
n
k
e
d
t
o
t
h
e
n
e
e
d
t
o
f
i
g
h
t
h
y
p
e
r
i
n
f
l
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
t
h
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
i
n
1
9
8
9
/
9
0
.
A
n
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
p
e
g
w
i
t
h
U
S
D
w
a
s
s
e
t
i
n
1
9
9
0
,
w
i
t
h
a
s
u
b
s
t
a
n
t
i
a
l
u
n
d
e
r
s
h
o
o
t
i
n
g
o
f
t
h
e
“
e
n
t
r
y
l
e
v
e
l
”
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
r
a
t
e
(
i
t
w
a
s
p
r
e
c
e
d
e
d
b
y
a
b
a
s
k
e
t
p
e
g
f
o
r
n
o
n
-
C
M
E
A
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
;
C
M
E
A
u
s
e
o
f
“
T
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
a
b
l
e
R
o
u
b
l
e
”
e
n
d
e
d
i
n
1
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
P
o
l
a
n
d
s
w
i
t
c
h
e
d
t
o
a
D
I
T
(
D
i
r
e
c
t
I
n
f
l
a
t
i
o
n
T
a
r
g
e
t
i
n
g
)
f
r
a
m
e
w
o
r
k
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
l
a
t
e
1
9
9
8
a
n
d
e
a
r
l
y
1
9
9
9
.
T
h
e
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
a
n
n
o
u
n
c
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
n
e
w
p
o
l
i
c
y
c
a
m
e
a
s
e
a
r
l
y
a
s
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
8
,
b
u
t
t
h
e
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
t
a
r
g
e
t
i
n
g
w
a
s
o
n
l
y
a
p
p
l
i
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
N
B
P
s
t
a
r
t
i
n
g
f
r
o
m
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
9
,
a
n
d
o
n
l
y
m
o
r
e
p
r
e
c
i
s
e
l
y
f
o
r
m
u
l
a
t
e
d
a
s
o
f
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
9
9
.
N
o
0
.
5
0
(
1
9
9
7
)
O
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
L
a
w
f
r
o
m
3
1
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
8
9
(
l
a
s
t
a
m
e
n
d
e
d
o
n
1
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
8
)
.
A
r
t
i
c
l
e
9
(
1
)
,
G
o
v
e
r
n
o
r
a
p
p
o
i
n
t
e
d
b
y
t
h
e2
3
2
3
1
9
9
1
)
.
A
n
o
t
h
e
r
d
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
M
a
y
1
9
9
1
(
o
f
1
7
%
)
w
a
s
f
o
l
l
o
w
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
c
r
a
w
l
i
n
g
p
e
g
o
f
t
h
e
P
o
l
i
s
h
Z
l
o
t
y
(
P
L
Z
)
t
o
a
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
b
a
s
k
e
t
(
U
S
D
/
D
E
M
/
G
B
P
/
F
R
F
/
C
H
F
)
b
y
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
1
9
9
1
.
O
t
h
e
r
d
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
l
l
o
w
e
d
i
n
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
2
(
1
0
.
7
%
)
a
n
d
i
n
A
u
g
u
s
t
1
9
9
3
,
w
h
e
n
a
m
o
n
t
h
l
y
c
r
a
w
l
r
a
t
e
o
f
1
.
6
%
w
a
s
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
e
d
.
T
h
e
p
a
c
e
o
f
t
h
e
p
r
o
g
r
e
s
s
i
v
e
f
l
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
r
e
g
i
m
e
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
c
r
a
w
l
i
n
g
b
a
n
d
r
e
g
i
m
e
w
i
t
h
±
7
%
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
b
a
n
d
s
i
n
M
a
y
1
9
9
5
(
t
h
e
n
e
w
r
e
g
i
m
e
w
i
t
n
e
s
s
e
d
t
h
e
f
i
r
s
t
Z
l
o
t
y
r
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
,
o
f
6
%
,
i
n
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
o
f
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
y
e
a
r
)
,
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
t
o
±
1
0
%
i
n
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
8
.
T
h
e
n
t
o
±
1
2
.
5
i
n
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
o
f
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
y
e
a
r
,
i
n
t
h
e
a
f
t
e
r
m
a
t
h
o
f
t
h
e
R
u
s
s
i
a
n
d
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
,
a
n
d
f
i
n
a
l
l
y
t
o
t
h
e
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
±
1
5
%
i
n
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
9
9
.
I
n
a
c
o
m
p
a
r
a
b
l
e
t
r
a
j
e
c
t
o
r
y
,
t
h
e
m
o
n
t
h
l
y
c
r
a
w
l
r
a
t
e
w
a
s
s
e
t
a
t
1
.
5
%
,
i
n
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
4
,
1
.
4
%
i
n
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
o
f
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
y
e
a
r
,
1
.
2
%
i
n
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
5
,
1
%
i
n
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
6
,
0
.
8
%
i
n
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
8
,
0
.
6
5
%
i
n
J
u
l
y
1
9
9
8
,
0
.
5
%
i
n
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
8
a
n
d
,
f
i
n
a
l
l
y
,
0
.
3
%
i
n
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
9
9
.
A
f
l
o
a
t
w
a
s
f
i
n
a
l
l
y
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
i
n
A
p
r
i
l
2
0
0
0
.
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
t
a
r
g
e
t
i
n
g
b
e
f
o
r
e
.
P
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
.
E
v
e
n
i
n
t
h
e
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
l
a
w
,
n
o
a
p
p
a
r
e
n
t
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
s
c
o
n
c
e
r
n
i
n
g
d
e
b
t
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
n
g
.
I
M
F
e
n
t
r
y
:
0
6
/
1
2
/
1
9
8
6
.
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
F
r
o
m
1
9
9
0
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
u
s
e
d
a
b
a
s
k
e
t
p
e
g
o
f
6
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
i
e
s
,
i
n
a
n
o
n
-
u
n
i
f
i
e
d
f
o
r
e
x
r
e
g
i
m
e
.
O
n
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
1
8
1
9
9
1
,
a
p
a
r
a
l
l
e
l
f
r
e
e
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
r
a
t
e
i
s
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
,
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
p
e
g
r
a
t
e
u
s
e
d
f
o
r
i
m
p
o
r
t
s
a
n
d
e
x
p
o
r
t
s
.
O
n
A
p
r
i
l
1
1
9
9
1
,
a
d
e
p
r
e
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
t
o
t
h
e
U
S
D
(
7
1
%
)
p
r
e
c
e
d
e
t
h
e
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
1
1
9
9
1
u
n
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
r
e
x
r
a
t
e
s
u
n
d
e
r
a
f
l
o
a
t
,
s
i
n
c
e
M
a
y
4
,
1
9
9
2
f
u
l
l
f
l
o
a
t
.
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
u
s
e
s
a
d
i
r
t
y
f
l
o
a
t
r
e
g
i
m
e
s
i
n
c
e
t
h
e
n
,
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
B
a
n
k
o
f
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
(
N
B
R
)
–
t
h
e
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
B
a
n
k
–
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
i
n
g
i
n
t
h
e
m
a
r
k
e
t
t
o
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
t
h
e
L
e
u
i
n
a
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
f
a
s
h
i
o
n
.
I
n
t
e
r
m
e
d
i
a
r
y
t
a
r
g
e
t
:
1
9
9
1
/
1
9
9
4
,
M
2
;
1
9
9
5
t
o
t
h
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
,
b
a
s
e
m
o
n
e
y
.
A
n
i
n
f
l
a
t
i
o
n
t
a
r
g
e
t
w
a
s
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
i
n
2
0
0
1
:
2
5
%
(
a
i
m
s
t
o
b
r
i
n
g
i
t
d
o
w
n
t
o
s
i
n
g
l
e
d
i
g
i
t
s
b
y
2
0
0
4
,
w
i
t
h
p
l
a
n
s
f
o
r
f
u
l
l
D
I
T
b
y
2
0
0
3
)
.
I
n
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
t
o
p
e
n
-
m
a
r
k
e
t
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
f
r
o
m
1
9
9
7
o
n
w
a
r
d
s
.
C
l
e
a
r
l
a
c
k
o
f
c
o
n
s
i
s
t
e
n
c
y
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
f
i
s
c
a
l
a
n
d
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
.
L
i
m
i
t
e
d
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
:
m
o
s
t
p
r
i
c
e
s
w
e
r
e
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
e
d
u
n
t
i
l
1
9
9
9
.
0
.
5
0
(
1
9
9
7
)
O
r
i
g
i
n
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